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BRIAN A. ELLISON*

Bureaucratic Politics, the Bureau of
Reclamation, and the Animas-La Plata
Project
ABSTRACT
At the end of the 1990s the Bureau of Reclamation’s Animas-La
Plata Project in southwestern Colorado—after 30 years of planning—stood on the edge of oblivion. Though the Bureau had successfully negotiated a series of complex environmental impact
negotiations, its construction of a reasonable and prudent alternative—designed to protect the endangered Colorado pikeminnow—
was a patchwork of arrangements that violated the spirit of the Endangered Species Act, several of the Bureau’s longstanding policies
regarding water rights, and congressional authorization of the project. Since then the Bureau has addressed each of the fundamental
flaws of the reasonable and prudent alternative, even securing a
reauthorization for the project, and the construction of the AnimasLa Plata Project is nearly complete. The purpose of this article is to
reflect on the conduct of distributive politics and explore how the
Bureau used its prowess in administrative process to save the
project.

I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (Bureau) is constructing the
Animas-La Plata Project (ALP) in southwest Colorado, near Durango
and the Four Corners area.1 ALP was first authorized for construction as
* Chair and Professor of Political Science, Department of Government and Justice
Studies, Appalachian State University, Boone, N.C.
1. The W.C. Kenney Watershed Protection Foundation, Denver, Colo., and the University Research Council, Appalachian State University, Boone, N.C., funded the research
conducted for this article. Testimonial data used for this article were collected through 13
personal interviews conducted with project proponents and opponents—representing local, state and federal agencies, elected officials, and environmental activists—on two research trips to Denver and Durango, Colo., and Albuquerque, N.M., in May 2006 and
March 2008. Documentary and archival data on the Animas-La Plata Project were collected
at numerous local, state and federal agencies, and on-line. Different types of evidence were
used to support substantive points in the ALP narrative and to shore-up internal validity in
the case study. See generally ROBERT K. YIN, CASE STUDY RESEARCH, DESIGN AND METHODS
(3rd ed. 2002); Randy Stoecker, Evaluating and Rethinking the Case Study, 39 THE SOC. REV. 88
(1991). This essay is also an update of earlier articles on the Animas-La Plata Project. See
generally Brian A. Ellison, Environmental Management and the New Politics of Western Water:
The Animas-La Plata Project and Implementation of the Endangered Species Act, 23 ENVTL.
MGMT. 429 (1999) [hereinafter Ellison, Environmental Management]; Brian A. Ellison, The Ad-
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a participating project in the Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968,2
which also approved construction of the Central Arizona Project and
four other projects in Colorado. ALP was a traditional reclamation project between 1968 and 1999, and would have provided a variety of irrigation, municipal and industrial, fish and wildlife, and recreation benefits
to people along the Animas River and La Plata River watersheds if constructed according to the Bureau’s plans. The purpose of the project was
to move water from the abundant Animas River to the drier La Plata
River, where the land is flatter and more suitable for irrigated farming.3
Like many other Bureau irrigation projects, ALP was never able to pass
any tests of economic feasibility mostly because the scale of the project—
calling for the irrigation of hundreds of thousands of acres with water
being lifted hundreds of feet above the Animas River—made it too expensive for area farmers to reimburse the Bureau with the sale of alfalfa
and surplus crops.4
Today, a different Animas-La Plata Project is being constructed. It
is no longer designed to move water from the Animas River to the La
Plata River, nor does it have an irrigation component. Instead, ALP is

vocacy Coalition Framework and Implementation of the Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in
Western Water Politics, 26 POL’Y STUD. J. 11 (1998); Hannah Gosnell, Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act and the Art of Compromise: The Evolution of a Reasonable and Prudent Alternative for the Animas-La Plata Project, 41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 561 (2001).
2. The Animas-La Plata Project has been authorized for construction three times. First
in the Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968, 43 U.S.C. 620 (1968), second in the Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights Settlement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-585, 102 Stat. 2973
(1988), and third in the Colorado Ute Settlement Act Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).
3. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, DENVER, COLORADO, DEFINITE PLAN REPORT:
ANIMAS-LA PLATA PROJECT—COLORADO AND NEW MEXICO (1979).
4. On April 18, 1977, President Jimmy Carter issued a statement on water resource
projects, referred to as Carter’s “hit list,” in which he announced the deletion of funds for
18 federal water projects. Jimmy Carter, Water Resource Projects, Statement Announcing
Administration Decisions (Apr. 18, 1977). The Animas-La Plata Project was not on that list
because the Senate had already eliminated it for financial considerations. Letter from Albert Nason to author, Archivist, Jimmy Carter Library, (Apr. 17, 2008) (on file with author).
Additionally, at least two independent benefit-cost analyses have been conducted on the
project, concluding that the project does not meet Bureau tests for economic feasibility.
Letter from Dale E. Lehman, Professor of Economics, Fort Lewis College, to the Regional
Director of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Salt Lake City, Utah (Nov. 29, 1992) (on file
with author); Memorandum from Charles W. Hope, Professor of Economics, University of
Colorado Boulder, to Regional Director, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Salt Lake City, UT
(Dec. 2, 1992) (on file with author). The project was split into two phases in 1986 in order to
enhance its economic feasibility through cost sharing by project participants. See generally
U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE CONCERNING THE COLORADO UTE
INDIAN WATER RIGHTS SETTLEMENT AND BINDING AGREEMENT FOR ANIMAS-LA PLATA COST
SHARING (1986).
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being constructed to resolve federal reserve water rights claims5 by the
Ute Mountain Ute and Southern Ute Indians on the rivers that transect
their reservations—reservations that lie in 15 by 110 mile horizontal
strips along the Colorado-New Mexico border in southwestern Colorado
and that include the Animas, La Plata, Piedra, and Florida Rivers.6 According to the Bureau and other project proponents, such as the Colorado Water Conservation Board, the adjudication of Native American
federal reserve water rights claims on these reservations would give the
Ute Mountain Ute and Southern Ute Tribes all of the water that is currently on the reservations.7 This adjudication could displace Anglo farmers on the reservations and cause a water war.8 Hence, the Bureau will
spend at least a half-billion dollars to construct a pumping station, inlet
conduit, the Ridges Basin Dam, and the Nighthorse Reservoir to store
57,090 acre-feet of water to be used by the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, the
Southern Ute Tribe, the State of Colorado, the Navajo Nation, and three
water districts.9 The Colorado Water Court has designated the water in

5. In Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 575-77 (1908), the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled that the water rights needed for the intended use of a federal reserve were established when Congress set aside the land. These water rights, known as federal reserve
water rights, “date from the year Congress created a reservation and exist whether or not
[they] have [been] put to beneficial use.” Judith E. Jacobsen, The Navajo Indian Irrigation
Project and Quantification of Navajo Winters Rights, 32 NAT. RESOURCES J. 825, 826 (1992). A
methodology for quantifying federal reserve water rights on Indian reservations was established in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963). The Supreme Court ruled that a tribe
is entitled to water needed for its practicable irrigable acreage. This quantification system
often leads to claims for water rights that exceed the amount of water in entire river basins.
Some in the Navajo Nation claim, for example, that they have title to more water than is
currently used by the states of “New Mexico, Arizona, California, Nevada, Utah, Colorado,
and Wyoming.” See Matt Jenkins, Seeking the Water Jackpot, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Mar. 17,
2008). See also DANIEL C. MCCOOL, NATIVE WATERS: CONTEMPORARY INDIAN WATER SETTLEMENTS AND THE SECOND TREATY ERA (2002); Ellison, Environmental Management, supra note
1.
6. Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights Settlement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-585, 102
Stat. 2973; Colorado Ute Settlement Act Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat.
2763.
7. Interview with D. Randolph Seaholm, Chief, Water Supply Protection, Colorado
Water Conservation Board, in Denver, Colo. (May 10, 2008).
8. This is the position of the U.S. government, the States of Colorado and New Mexico, the Tribes, Tribal attorneys, and a host of others.
9. The table of project beneficiaries with storage in Nighthorse Reservoir include (in
acre-feet):
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the reservoir for municipal and industrial use,10 though none of the project participants presently have the capacity to use the water.11
The Bureau has a longstanding and proud tradition of constructing projects—indeed some of the world’s largest dams and reservoirs—
to provide the nation with reclamation benefits.12 For the most part, reclamation has meant irrigation but real benefits also include municipal
and industrial use, power generation, flood control, and recreation. Another mainstay of the reclamation program has been that reclamation
beneficiaries pay the government for the public goods they receive from
projects, even if those repayments are heavily subsidized through the
agency’s “cash register” dams.13 The revenues from these large dams and
reservoirs—constructed on the Colorado, Columbia and other rivers—
are used to help pay for irrigation projects that would not be affordable
otherwise. Therefore, a balance of payments is theoretically maintained
for the reclamation program—a practice known as river-basin accounting. ALP, however, goes beyond the old system of river basin accounting
because most project costs will not be repaid. ALP will also require enormous operational subsidies in the form of the electricity needed to pump
water uphill to fill Nighthorse Reservoir.14 Still, many critical questions

Southern Ute Tribe: 16,525
Ute Mountain Ute Tribe: 16,525
ALP Water Conservancy District: 2,600
State of Colorado: 5,320
Navajo Nation: 2,340
San Juan Water Commission:10,400
La Plata Water Conservancy Dist.: 780
TOTAL: 54,490
Colorado Ute Settlement Act Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763.
10. Colorado District Court, Water Division 7, Case Nos. W-1603-76F, W-1603-76J, 02
CW 85, and 02 CW 86 (2006).
11. Interview with Phillip T. Doe, Chair, Citizens Progressive Alliance and Alison
Maynard, Attorney, Citizens Progressive Alliance, Denver, Colo. (Mar. 10, 2008). Interview
with D. Randolph Seaholm, supra note 7.
12. Even Marc Reisner’s classic critique of the Bureau of Reclamation pays tribute to
the agency’s accomplishments. See generally MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER (Rev. ed. 1993).
13. Cash register dams, generally a derogatory term, were primarily constructed to
generate hydropower revenues that could be used to pay for projects that were not economically feasible; usually irrigation projects like the original ALP. River-basin accounting
allowed the Bureau to demonstrate the economic feasibility of its system, rather than a
single project, and gave the agency the argument it needed to build more water projects—
even water projects that were completely lacking in economic, environmental, or reclamation logic. See Reisner, supra note 12 at 135–136.
14. The Animas-La Plata Project that is currently under construction has three main
features: a pumping plant on the Animas River, an inlet conduit, and Nighthorse Reservoir
and Ridges Basin Dam. Water will be drawn from the Animas River and pumped 552 feet
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about the Animas-La Plata Project remain unanswered: (1) how and
when will any of the project beneficiaries use the water stored in
Nighthorse Reservoir?; and, (2) why construct the project when it has
been demonstrated that non-structural solutions to Native American
water rights claims are effective and acceptable?15
Perhaps the most interesting development in the face of these
questions is that 18 years ago ALP was at a virtual standstill over a series
of issues related to the protection of endangered species in the San Juan
River Basin. The fundamental issue was that in 1990 the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service (Service) determined ALP posed a threat to the endangered Colorado pikeminnow in the San Juan River Basin and released a
draft “jeopardy” biological opinion that did not include a reasonable and
prudent alternative.16 Though the Service released a final biological opinion that included a reasonable and prudent alternative in 1991,17 several
of its features were clearly illegal and violated the congressional intent of
both the Endangered Species Act and the Animas-La Plata Project.18 Yet
today, 18 years later, ALP is near completion.
The purpose of this article is to describe how officials in the Bureau and project proponents used their prowess in administrative process to secure funding for the construction of ALP in the face of
enormous obstacles. This description is difficult because sorting through
the administrative morass that surrounds the project is deliberately

uphill for delivery into the reservoir. The Bureau estimates that the project will require
67,100,100 kWh of electricity, but notes this power is being delivered cheaply under the
obligations of the Colorado River Storage Project Act. Interview with Barry Longwell, Deputy Construction Engineer, Four Corners Construction Office, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation,
Durango, Colo. (Mar. 14, 2008).
15. The Ute Mountain Ute and Southern Ute Tribes received $40 million dollars in the
Colorado Ute Settlement Act of 2000 to purchase 13,000 acre-feet of water rights on the
Pine, Florida, Animas, La Plata and Mancos Rivers, and McElmo Creek because ALP does
not meet the Tribes’ allocation under the Colorado Ute Indian Final Settlement Agreement
of 1986 as ratified in the Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights Settlement Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-585, 102 Stat. 2973.
16. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, DRAFT BIOLOGICAL OPINION FOR THE ANIMAS-LA
PLATA PROJECT, COLORADO AND NEW MEXICO (1990). According to the regulations that govern implementation of the Endangered Species Act, an agency is required to consult with
the Service if its actions will affect an endangered species or its habitat. 50 C.F.R. § 402
(June 3, 1986) (implementing regulations for the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1531–1543). This is called a Section 7 consultation and the result is either a “no jeopardy”
or “jeopardy” biological opinion on the project. Id. If the Service issues a jeopardy biological
opinion, the action agency and the Service may develop a “reasonable and prudent alternative” designed to mitigate the impacts of an action. Id.
17. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, FINAL BIOLOGICAL OPINION FOR THE ANIMAS-LA
PLATA PROJECT, COLORADO AND NEW MEXICO (1991).
18. See generally Ellison, Environmental Management, supra note 1.
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daunting. It not only reflects the complexity associated with natural resources development but, more fundamentally, the demise of federalism
and constitutional politics, and the rise of the administrative state. Today, agencies and the administrative process—rather than Congress and
the democratic process—dominate politics in distributive policy arenas.19
One effect of this decision-making transition—from constitutional politics to administrative process—has been to distract and desensitize the
public to a variety of political issues that should be front-and-center,
such as discussions about natural resources development. The AnimasLa Plata Project makes a good case to illuminate this point because the
project is fraught with issues, which range from the protection of endangered species and the environment, to reasonable concern for taxpayer
money, to the settlement of Native American water rights claims and the
re-regulation of the San Juan River, that have largely been settled
administratively.
The discussion in the following section will examine the relationship between bureaucratic politics and natural resources management.
Next, the resolution of a variety of problems in water resources management in the San Juan River Basin will be illuminated through an updated
case study of Endangered Species Act compliance for the Animas-La
Plata Project. Finally, lessons from this system of distributive politics
through bureaucratic government will be discussed along with a qualitative analysis of the costs and benefits associated with this type of
governing.
II. BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS AND THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Gary Lawson declared in the Harvard Law Review that “[t]he postNew Deal administrative state is unconstitutional.”20 By unconstitutional, Lawson contends that the administrative state is at a “variance
with the Constitution’s original public meaning.”21 His argument rests
on the assertion that not only does the administrative state have legislative, executive, and judicial powers, but that the formal political institutions—Congress, the Presidency, and the Supreme Court—have
abandoned the sacred precepts of American government, such as the
nondelegation doctrine, the unitary executive, and the independent judi-

19. Id.
20. Gary Lawson, The Rise and the Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1231, 1231 (1993–1994). For a similar argument, see generally DOUGLAS YATES, BUREAUCRATIC DEMOCRACY: THE SEARCH FOR DEMOCRACY AND EFFICIENCY IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1982).
21. Lawson, supra note 20.
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ciary. Even more dramatically, Lawson argues that the administrative
state is made powerful because we have abandoned the concept of a limited national government, as enshrined in the enumerated powers of Article I of the U.S. Constitution. Hence, actors in the national government
feel little compunction when they meddle in education, health care, elections, local public administration, and other areas of governing that are
reserved to the states.22
Lawson’s argument is dramatic but understated. The United
States of America is largely governed by the administrative state, which
includes national, state, and local agencies that share jurisdiction over
substantive policy arenas. It should not be inferred that legislatures,
elected executives, and judiciaries do not have significant powers, because they do. Each of these institutions still checks administrative
power here and there, especially when the constituency of a significant
politician is affected. But most administrative activities go unnoticed and
most arenas of governing have become so complex that it is extraordinarily difficult for citizens to participate.
This complexity is prevalent in natural resources management
and, especially so, in water resources development. In order to secure the
start of construction on the Animas-La Plata Project, for example, Bureau
officials wrote an environmental impact statement, conducted a “Section
7” consultation on the protection of endangered species, applied for a
dredge and fill permit, applied for the adjudication of water rights, managed cultural resources, and wrote contracts under the Indian Self Determination and Education Assistance Act, all while negotiating with
groups and governments as diverse as tribal governments, states, municipalities, special districts, interested parties, and other state and federal
agencies. Yet, this is just the tip of the administrative iceberg.
At the heart of all this activity are concerns about who wins and
who loses in governing. Politics is often defined as the “authoritative allocation of values for a society”23 and should be ideally conducted by our
political institutions—legislatures, elected executives, and high courts—
at the appropriate level of government. Meanwhile, the purpose of the
administrative state is to deliver public goods and services.24 Thus, agencies should respond once Congress decides that action is necessary. Unfortunately, this assertion is democratic wishful thinking because it does
not describe how governing in America is conducted. In distributive pol-

22. See id.
23. DAVID EASTON, THE POLITICAL SYSTEM: AN INQUIRY INTO THE STATE OF POLITICAL
SCIENCE 134 (1953).
24. Brian A. Ellison, Public Administration Reform in Eastern Europe: A Research Note and
a Look at Bulgaria, 39 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 221, 222 (2007).
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icy arenas25 in particular, administrative agencies and their clientele provide politicians with the justification for action. This is nothing new.
What is different, however, is that the platform for the conduct of distributive politics is not Congress and the appropriations process, but agencies and administrative process. For example, those who control the flow
of information that goes into writing a successful environmental impact
statement decide the winners and losers in natural resource
management.
A. Bureaucratic Politics
The administrative state in the United States is a collection of public organizations—referred to as departments, agencies, bureaus, commissions, and public corporations—all created through the political
process to deliver public goods and services. Though ostensibly considered the managers of governments, scholars know that administrators
are political actors themselves, and that they have a stake in how policy
should be constructed and how public goods and services should be delivered.26 A good deal of political and scholarly attention has been devoted to the role of administrators in the policy process because the U.S.
Constitution provides us with little guidance regarding the construction
of the administrative state—save the reference to the President’s ability
to choose a cabinet in Article II. The role of the administrative state was
not a concern when government in the United States was relatively sim-

25. Theories of distributive policy formulation have typically dominated discussions
about the construction of western water projects. The argument is that spending on western water projects reflects a political calculus designed to ensure particularistic benefits for
farmers, municipalities, and power users and continuing reelection for congresspersons,
while the costs are broadly dispersed across the country. The strength of this system, often
called an “iron triangle” or a sub-government, lay in the ability of a few key western congresspersons to control the flow of authorizations and appropriations for western water
projects. See DANIEL C. MCCOOL, COMMAND OF THE WATERS: IRON TRIANGLES AND FEDERAL
WATER DEVELOPMENT 5–12 (1994). See generally T.R. Miller, Recent Trends in Federal Water
Resource Management: Are “Iron Triangles” in Retreat?, 5 POL’Y STUD. REV. 395 (1985); THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES (1979);
Dean E. Mann, Political Incentives in U.S. Water Policy: Relationships Between Distributive and
Regulatory Politics, in WHAT GOVERNMENT DOES (Mathew Holden, Jr. & D.L. Dresang, eds.,
1975); EMMETT S. REDFORD, DEMOCRACY AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1969); ARTHUR
MAASS, MUDDY WATERS (1951).
26. See generally DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY
(2001); Larry B. Hill, Who Governs the Administrative State? A Bureaucratic-Centered Image of
Governance, 1 J. OF PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 261 (1991); JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY:
WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT (1989); HAROLD SEIDMAN & R.
GILMOUR, POLITICS, POSITION AND POWER: FROM THE POSITIVE TO THE REGULATORY STATE
(1986); FRANCIS E. ROURKE, BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (3rd. ed. 1984).
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ple. We began with an administrative state that was organized and managed by gentlemen between 1789 and the 1820s. Then Democratic
reformers in the late 1820s, lead by President Andrew Jackson, argued
that political partisans should manage government and that gave rise to
the spoils system.27
These systems of public administration were developed when the
United States was in its infancy, which did not last long. By the late
1800s, the United States had the world’s largest and most productive
economy, and reformers sought to construct a government that could
manage it.28 During the progressive era, roughly 1883 to 1921, the foundation for the modern administrative state was constructed on the “gospel of efficiency,”29 the scientific management movement,30 and political
neutrality in public administration.31 Although the scholarship on these
fundamental tenets of administration is vast and a good deal of debate
continues regarding the influence of these various movements, these
ideas formed the foundation for administrative statecraft during the progressive era and continue to influence administrative activity today.32 Indeed, the influence of science and efficiency was so significant that most
major administrative reforms since the progressive era have sought to
protect democratic accountability on the one hand and promote administrative rationality on the other.33 By 1946, the country recognized the
need to check administrative power—specifically, to draw some line between the exercise of executive, legislative, and judicial powers by agen-

27. See FREDERICK C. MOSHER, DEMOCRACY AND THE PUBLIC SERVICE 64–66 (2nd ed.
1982).
28. See HERBERT DAVID CROLY, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE 157–194 (2007).
29. See SAMUEL P. HAYES, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY: THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT 1890–1920 (1959).
30. See FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT (Norton Library 1967) (1911).
31. See Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197 (1887).
32. This is especially true in natural resources management because the developmental agencies—the U.S. Forest Service, Bureau of Reclamation, Bureau of Land Management
(BLM), U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, and the National Park Service—were largely constructed on the ideas of the conservationists and conservationism, which was a fundamental feature of progressive thinking. Reform in these organizations—some created with
different names, like the Grazing Service (now BLM)—followed a management reform process through the introduction of concepts such as dominant use, multiple use, and ecosystems management. Water resource managers now talk about adaptive management and
conjunctive management. The bottom line of all these reforms is seeking the proper balance
between science and democracy.
33. Brian A. Ellison, Bureaucratic Politics as Agency Competition: A Comparative Perspective, 29 INT’L. J. OF PUB. ADMIN. 1259, 1262 (2006).
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cies—and did so through the Administrative Procedure Act.34 The
plethora of legislation passed during the environmental movement—
with cross-cutting requirements and standing for citizens to sue agencies
that failed to comply with them—was an effort to check science with
science and bring some democratic practice to administrative decisionmaking.35 Recent management movements in public administration, including the concerns about representative bureaucracy,36 Total Quality
Management,37 and the New Public Management,38 fit these same themes
of reform.39
B. Bureaucratic Competition in the Policy Process
Competition is the essence of bureaucratic politics and power.40
Administrators compete in the policy process to maintain their interests

34. See Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 440–441 (1989).
35. One reason the environmental movement—a label we use to describe creation of
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1970 and passage of a host of environmental protection legislation, such as the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42
U.S.C. § 4331 (1970), Clean Water Act (Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (1972), Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1531–1544 (1973)—is important in that it changed the way Congress charged agencies
with responsibility to protect the environment. Rather than create an agency to implement
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), Congress made all agencies responsible for
assessing environmental impacts and writing environmental impact statements. Hence, the
regulations crossed agencies and are called cross-cutting requirements. These statutes also
gave citizens standing to sue federal agencies that failed to implement them. Another reform is that the EPA Administrator was to be held politically accountable for the implementation of technical responsibilities—such as the establishment of standards for point
sources of pollution as required by the Clean Water Act. These provisions were designed to
force administrators to protect the environment. An empirical assessment of the struggle
between elected officials and bureaucratic power is provided in B. Dan Wood, Principles,
Bureaucrats, and Responsiveness in Clean Air Enforcements, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 213 (1988).
Wood demonstrates that these statutes gave agencies formidable power in bureaucratic
politics.
36. See MOSHER supra note 27, at 98–102.
37. See generally W. EDWARDS DEMING, THE NEW ECONOMICS: FOR INDUSTRY, GOVERNMENT, EDUCATION (2nd ed. 2000).
38. See generally DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW THE
ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR (1993).
39. See generally JACK H. KNOTT & GARY J. MILLER, REFORMING BUREAUCRACY: THE
POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE (1987); JOHN P. BURKE, BUREAUCRATIC RESPONSIBILITY
(1986).
40. Todd Kunioka & Lawrence S. Rothenberg, The Politics of Bureaucratic Competition:
The Case of Natural Resource Policy, 12 J. OF POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 700 (1993); Jonathan
Bender & Terry M. Moe, An Adaptive Model of Bureaucratic Politics, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 755
(1985).
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and achieve their goals.41 The critical question is what are those administrative interests and goals, and are they in the public interest? Early
scholars of bureaucratic politics contended that agencies struggle for
more resources—more money, employees, and responsibilities.42 Thus,
like any corporation in the private sector, administrators compete for an
ever-greater share of the public market. Though this struggle for more
resources is not necessarily insidious—indeed the New Public Management is constructed on this idea—William A. Niskanen argues that administrative interest is fundamentally at odds with the public interest
because we lack a theory of administrative statecraft that relates the
“preferences of constituencies” to the activities of agencies.43 The distance
between democratic accountability and administrative rationality is
structural and inevitable, and a feature of human nature and a weakness
of political science.
A second set of scholars argue that administrators and agencies
are more interested in the maintenance of agency autonomy than expanding their reach and resources. James Q. Wilson defines autonomy as
relatively undisputed jurisdiction over specific policy arenas.44 Thus, administrators avoid new responsibilities because they rarely come with
expanded resources. Instead, new responsibilities carry the burden of
new clients, more oversight, and new opportunities for failure. This is
especially true when new responsibilities are in conflict with the
agency’s basic operational objectives, or “core tasks.”45 In recent work,
Daniel P. Carpenter defined autonomy in terms of the agency’s independent policymaking power.46 He argues that administrators in successfully autonomous agencies offer unique services and understand how to
protect themselves through multiple and diverse political affiliations.47
Thus, organizational autonomy is a function of an agency’s ability to
protect the legal, technical, and fiscal mechanisms that structure its
jurisdiction.48

41. See Brian A. Ellison, Autonomy in Action: Bureaucratic Competition Among Functional
Rivals in Denver Water Politics, 14.5 POL’Y STUD. REV. 25–48 (1995). See generally FRANCIS E.
ROURKE, BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (3rd ed. 1984).
42. See Ellison, supra note 41. See generally WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971).
43. Niskanen, supra note 42, at 27, 128.
44. Wilson, supra note 31, at 183.
45. Id. at 223–224.
46. CARPENTER, supra note 26, at 18.
47. Id. at 31.
48. Stephen P. Mumme & Scott T. Moore, Agency Autonomy in Transboundary Resource
Management: The United States Section of the International Boundary and Water Commission,
United States and Mexico, 30 NAT. RESOURCES J. 661, 664 (1990).
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Whether administrators struggle in the policy process for more
resources and responsibilities or agency autonomy, many scholars of bureaucratic politics point to two fundamental sources of power—expertise
and constituency support49—that administrators use to compete in the
policy process. Though all agencies possess some aspects of these
sources of power, some are better suited to demonstrate them than
others. Agencies that provide the public with tangible benefits, such as
the construction of a dam and reservoir, tend to be more successful in the
eyes of the public than regulatory agencies that often have the unwanted
task of controlling behavior.50 For the purposes of this study, these two
sources of bureaucratic power will be described in the context of managing and controlling administrative process.
Expertise is the essence of administrative statecraft in the United
States.51 In general, we put our engineers in one agency, our biologists in
another, and our social workers in yet another in order to, theoretically,
protect the public interest and produce efficiency. The public interest is
protected because administrative discretion in agencies is checked with
professionalism rather than politics, and efficiency is produced through
specialization. Expertise is a critical source of power for administrators
because it allows them to control the flow of information and advice. In a
related vein, agencies that are structured around a dominant profession
tend to have more power in the policy process than those that do not.52
Constituency support can be understood as the management of internal
and external groups, both private and public, in the policy process.53
In summary, administrators use these sources of bureaucratic
power to compete in the policy process—which involves the collection of
resources and the protection of autonomy. Ideally, administrators struggle to protect their ability to make public policy and deliver public goods
and services; they want to define what needs to be done and do it. Administrators protect their autonomy through competition, by controlling
49. ROURKE, supra note 41, at 15, 48. See also Wood, supra note 35; HAROLD SEIDMAN &
R. GILMOUR, POLITICS, POSITION AND POWER: FROM THE POSITIVE TO THE REGULATORY STATE
(1986); JEANNE NIENABER CLARKE & DANIEL C. MCCOOL, STAKING OUT THE TERRAIN: POWER
DIFFERENTIALS AMONG NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AGENCIES (1985).
50. CLARKE & MCCOOL, supra note 49, at 7.
51. ROURKE, supra note 41, at 108.
52. BRIAN J. COOK, BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS AND REGULATORY REFORM: THE EPA AND
EMISSIONS TRADING 59–60 (1988). Cook provides an interesting study on competition among
professions in the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the development of
solutions to air pollution. Lawyers in the EPA advocated a regulatory scheme, scientists
advocated a technical solution, and economists urged the development of a market solution. The economists won because they made a better case to the public for their solution.
Id. at 124. See also CLARKE & MCCOOL, supra note 49.
53. ROURKE, supra note 41, at 125.
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decision-making, and fending off their rivals in the policy process. Finally, it is important to note that the purpose of this article is not to provide a normative argument regarding the ability of agencies to protect
the environment through the implementation of cross-cutting regulations. The purpose of the article is to describe how administrators get
what they want from the policy process, which is often in contradiction
to sound environmental management. Indeed, Robert Paehlke and
Douglas Torgerson contend that environmental protection tends to be of
secondary consideration in these processes.54 Instead, the fundamental
objective of governance in these policy arenas is maintaining development rather than protecting the environment.55
III. THE ANIMAS-LA PLATA PROJECT AND IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
Starting construction on the Animas-La Plata Project took a good
deal of time because, for many years, it was a project looking for a purpose rather than a purpose looking for project. As noted earlier, the initial idea—proposed as early as 1904—was to move water for irrigation
from the Animas River to the La Plata River watershed. In 1956, Congress called for a feasibility report for the project—delivered in 1966—
which described the project as a dam and reservoir high on the Animas
River with a gravity flow diversion to the La Plata River.56 When ALP
was authorized for construction in 1968, it was the product of simple
pork-barrel politicking, Colorado’s western versus eastern slope conflict
over water and development, and the struggle to store state allocations
under the Colorado River Compact of 1922.57 Congressman Wayne Aspinall, a Democrat from Colorado’s 3rd District and chairman of the
House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, brokered a deal in
which he exchanged his support for the Central Arizona Project for
broader congressional support of ALP and four other Colorado water
projects.58
54. Douglas Torgerson & Robert Paehlke, Environmental Administration: Revising the
Agenda of Inquiry and Practice, in MANAGING LEVIATHAN: ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (Douglas Torgerson & Robert Paehlke, eds., 2005).
55. Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT GOVERN? 306–320 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson, eds., 1989). Moe contends that agencies
were not constructed to be effective. Instead, their structure, and therefore behavior, is a
reflection of interest group politics. Id. at 267.
56. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE ANIMAS-LA PLATA PROJECT, COLORADO-NEW MEXICO: PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF 53 STAT. 1187 (1967).
57. REISNER, supra note 12, at 290–293. See also HELEN INGRAM, WATER POLITICS: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE (1990).
58. REISNER, supra note 12, at 290–293.
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ALP has always had some features that would serve Native
Americans. Water was made available to Native Americans for cattle in
the 1966 feasibility report, and the 1979 Definite Plan Report listed Native Americans among the project’s beneficiaries.59 But these were secondary aspects because ALP was designed to be an irrigation project for
Anglo farmers.60 ALP became a Native American water project after the
Ute Mountain Ute Indians sued for adjudication and quantification of
their water rights on the Ute Mountain Ute Reservation in 1972.61 This
action, taken up by the U.S. Department of Justice and subsequent calls
by the Carter and Reagan administrations for cost sharing by project proponents, forced them into a somewhat unusual process designed to resolve these problems. The result was two agreements that would resolve
Native American water rights claims62 and to provide cost-sharing by
project beneficiaries—especially the states.63 Taken together, the agreements split the Animas-La Plata Project into two phases. Phase one
59. There is some confusion with regard to ALP and the “hit list.” See discussion supra
note 4. James Decker contends that the project survived because it was deemed beneficial
to Native Americans. James C. Decker, Conflicts in the Department of the Interior: Water Project, Indian Trust Responsibility, and Squawfish, COMMON GROUND, THE THIRD ANNUAL NATIONAL STUDENT ENVIRONMENTAL CONFERENCE 26 (1991). We could also conclude by
inference that Carter did not veto the project because the Definite Plan Report for the project had not been completed and, hence, was not ripe for consideration.
60. Land ownership on the Southern Ute Reservation is complex. The Southern Ute
Tribe accepted the federal government’s allotment plan for the reservation in 1894–1895,
meaning that members of the Southern Ute Tribe accepted individual parcels of land.
Meanwhile, the Weeminuche Band, now Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, moved to the western
part of the Southern Ute Reservation to protest the allotment program. The reservation was
open to homesteading in 1899. The subsequent sale of allotments to non-Indians created a
checkerboard pattern of land ownership on the Southern Ute Reservation in which the
most productive lands are in the hands of non-Indians. This is an extremely complicated
story that has mostly been pieced together through the Supreme Court’s decision in United
States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians, 402 U.S. 159 (1971).
The map on page 2-32 of the Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement
(2000) provides a picture of land available for sale on the Southern Ute and Ute Mountain
Ute Reservations. No land is available for sale on the Ute Mountain Ute Reservation, while
non-Indians own most of the acreage along the La Plata, Animas, Florida and Pine Rivers
on the Southern Ute Reservation. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, ANIMAS-LA PLATA PROJECT,
COLORADO-NEW MEXICO: FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (2000)
[hereinafter U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FSEIS], available at www.usbr.gov/uc/envdocs/
eis/animas/fseis/index.
61. Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights Settlement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-585, 102
Stat. 2973. In 2007 there were 9,500 non-Indians living on the Southern Ute Reservation
along with only 1,000 members of the Southern Ute Tribe. Susan Moran, Indian Tribe Becomes Force in West’s Energy Boom, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2007.
62. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO UTE INDIAN WATER RIGHTS FINAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (1986).
63. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, supra note 4.
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would be constructed and financed by the Bureau, and phase two would
be financed by the states and built on an indeterminate schedule. In exchange for quantification of their water rights on the reservations, the
water rights in the Animas-La Plata and Dolores projects, as well as a
$60.5 million Tribal Development Fund, the Ute Mountain Ute and
Southern Ute Indians agreed to relinquish their claims to federal reserve
water rights on the reservations if phase one of the Animas-La Plata Project was constructed by the year 2000. Congress ratified these agreements
in the Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights Settlement Act of 1988.64
A. Implementing the Endangered Species Act
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service issued a draft jeopardy biological opinion just when the stage was set for construction to begin on the
project in May 1990.65 In the draft opinion, the Service contended that
ALP would harm critical habitat for the Colorado pikeminnow but offered no reasonable and prudent alternative (RPA). In response, the Bureau assembled three committees—biological, hydrological, and legal—
to form a response to the draft biological opinion and develop an RPA.66
In 1991, the Service issued a final biological opinion that did include an
RPA for ALP. Though complex, the Service acquiesced to a Bureau proposal for an RPA that included these elements:
1. Limit construction of the Animas-La Plata Project to three
features—Ridges Basin Reservoir, Durango Pumping Plant,
and the inlet conduit—and to limit depletions to 57,100 acrefeet;
2. Fund a seven-year research effort on the San Juan River and
its tributaries;
3. Operate Navajo Dam for the duration of the research project to mimic the natural hydrograph of the San Juan River;
4. Operate Navajo Dam for the benefit of the Colorado
[pikeminnow] for the life of the Animas-La Plata Project;
5. Develop a recovery implementation program for the Colorado [pikeminnow] on the San Juan River.67

64. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, supra note 3.
65. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., DRAFT BIOLOGICAL OPINION FOR THE ANIMAS LA PLATA
PROJECT, COLORADO AND NEW MEXICO (1990). For a full description of the proceedings leading to the development of the reasonable and prudent alternative for ALP, see Ellison,
Environmental Management, supra note 1.
66. Ellison, Environmental Management, supra note 1.
67. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., FINAL BIOLOGICAL OPINION FOR THE ANIMAS-LA PLATA
PROJECT, COLORADO AND NEW MEXICO 32–33 (1991).
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According to the implementing regulations of the Endangered Species
Act, an alternative is considered reasonable and prudent if:
1. It can be implemented by the lead federal agency in a manner consistent with the intended purposes of the project;
2. The Service believes it would avoid the likelihood of jeopardizing the continued existence of the listed species;
3. It can be formulated in such a way that it can be implemented by the lead federal agency consistent with the scope of
its legal authority and jurisdiction;
4. It is economically and technically feasible.68

These criteria can be used to assess the degree to which the RPA is
in compliance with the implementing regulations of the Endangered
Species Act. In 1991, the RPA violated each of these criteria. A brief summary of how the RPA violated these criteria, along with a description of
the Bureau’s subsequent activities, is provided in the following sections.
1. “It can be implemented by the lead federal agency in a manner consistent
with the intended purpose of the project.” 69
As noted earlier, in 1991 the Animas-La Plata Project was one of
the Bureau’s last and largest reclamation projects. It included pumping
stations, two storage reservoirs, conduits, laterals, canals, etc., all designed to transfer irrigation water from the Animas River to the La Plata
River. Construction of the three initial features, as contemplated in the
1991 RPA, clearly violated the law and the spirit of ALP with regard to
this first criterion since the three initial features would not provide irrigation benefits or transfer water from the Animas to the La Plata.
Several factors came together to force the Bureau to redesign ALP
and to seek a new authorization for it. The most important of these factors was the Colorado Ute Water Rights Settlement Act of 1988, which
required construction of phase one of ALP by the year 2000 in order to
avoid costly litigation by the Tribes for their water rights. In 1996, Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt and Colorado Governor Roy Romer
created a process designed to resolve the ALP impasse as the pace of
administrative, scientific, and fiscal processes made it clear that this
deadline would not be met.70 The “Romer/Schoettler process”71 brought

68. ESA Final Rule, 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1986).
69. Id.
70. For a broad description of the ALP problem and the Romer/Schoettler process, see
Ed Marston, Cease-fire Called on the Animas-La Plata Front, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Nov. 11,
1996.
71. The process was also named after Colorado Lt. Governor Gail Schoettler.
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a variety of groups to the negotiating table—including several project
opponents such as Earth Justice—and produced a justification for a
scaled down ALP, containing both structural and non-structural components that could be used to meet the needs of the Ute Tribes. These components included, for example, the expansion of existing federal water
storage facilities in the San Juan River Basin, water conservation proposals, and a fund for the acquisition of water rights. Though a catalyst for
change, Secretary Babbitt rejected the Romer/Schoettler proposal and instead entered into a series of secret negotiations with the Ute Tribes and
project proponents. The Animas-La Plata Project that emerged from
these negotiations did not have an irrigation component but did include
a municipal and industrial reservoir for the Ute Tribes, the Navajo Nation, and several special districts, and it provided a $40 million fund for
the Tribes to purchase water rights; it also included the Navajo Nation
Municipal Pipeline. The proposal also came with a promise to subject the
project to “full environmental review, including a review of competing
non-structural proposals to settle the Tribes’ water rights claims.”72
The Bureau successfully sought and attained reauthorization of
ALP based on this proposal. The Colorado Ute Settlement Act Amendments of 2000 authorized the Bureau to construct, operate, and maintain
“a reservoir, a pumping plant, a reservoir inlet conduit, and appurtenant
facilities with sufficient capacity to divert and store water from the
Animas River to provide for an average annual depletion of 57,100 acrefeet of water to be used for a municipal and industrial water supply.”73
Thus, the Animas-La Plata Project was changed from a large, trans-basin
diversion and irrigation project to a smaller municipal and industrial
water supply project.
2. “The Service believes it would avoid the likelihood of jeopardizing the
continued existence of the listed species.” 74
The Service concluded three times that construction of ALP would
jeopardize the Colorado pikeminnow and its habitat.75 In 1979, the Ser-

72. Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights: Testimony on S. 2508, The Colorado Ute Settlement
Act Amendments of 2000, 106th Cong. 3 (2000) (statement of David J. Hayes, Deputy Sec’y of
the Interior before the Senate Commission on Indian Affairs).
73. Colorado Ute Settlement Act Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114. Stat.
2763.
74. ESA Final Rule, 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1986).
75. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., BIOLOGICAL OPINION FOR THE ANIMAS-LA PLATA PROJECT, COLORADO AND NEW MEXICO (1979); U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, DRAFT BIOLOGICAL
OPINION FOR THE ANIMAS-LA PLATA PROJECT, COLORADO AND NEW MEXICO (1990); U.S. FISH
& WILDLIFE SERVICE, FINAL BIOLOGICAL OPINION FOR THE ANIMAS-LA PLATA PROJECT, COLORADO AND NEW MEXICO (1991).
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vice noted that while the Animas-La Plata Project would “further degrade the San Juan River to a point that this population would be lost,”
the species would continue to survive in the Green and Colorado Rivers.76 In 1990, the Service changed its position on the expendability of the
San Juan River pikeminnow population and issued a jeopardy biological
opinion on ALP. In 1991, the Service concluded that it could not support
construction of the full ALP and acquiesced on construction of the three
initial features because it could not determine—in the context of mitigation strategies and hydrological modeling—what affect these features
would have on the pikeminnow. In the end, the RPA was built on the
odd logic that a study of the pikeminnow should continue along with
construction of a project that threatens them.77
At the heart of this conflict are the needs of the Colorado pikeminnow. The pikeminnow survived in western river systems that have historically had great seasonable variations in flow; melting winter snow
packs brought spring deluges, with lesser flows in the summer. It has
been documented that pikeminnow reproduction occurs in response to
the combination of silt, seasonal pulses of water, and access to flooded
areas. Service biologists believed in 1990 that the free flowing Animas
River, the only substantial unregulated river in the San Juan River Basin,
had helped the pikeminnow survive. Thus, the key to the RPA in the
1991 final biological opinion was agreement that the Bureau would spill
approximately 300,000 acre-feet of water from Navajo Reservoir to
mimic the natural hydrograph of the San Juan River.78
While the Service biologists considered this a “biologically indefensible” solution in 1991, the program seems to be working today.
The research effort, in combination with a sophisticated spill regime,79
have produced conditions on the San Juan River that are positively affecting the pikeminnow and the razorback sucker, another endangered
species.80 These improved ecological conditions are reflected in water
quality, energy sources, physical habitat, and biotic interactions—in

76. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., BIOLOGICAL OPINION FOR THE ANIMAS-LA PLATA PROCOLORADO AND NEW MEXICO 5 (1979).
77. See id. See also Brian A. Ellison, The Advocacy Coalition Framework and Implementation
of the Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in Western Water Politics, 26.1 POL’Y STUD. J. 11–29
(1998).
78. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., FINAL BIOLOGICAL OPINION FOR THE ANIMAS-LA PLATA
PROJECT, COLORADO AND NEW MEXICO 32–35 (1991).
79. PAUL B. HOLDEN, FLOW RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE SAN JUAN RIVER. SAN JUAN
RIVER RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (1999).
80. Interview with James E. Brooks, Project Leader, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., in Albuquerque, N.M. (Mar. 12, 2008). Interview with David L. Propst, Ichthyologist Conservation
Services Div., N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish, in Albuquerque, N.M. (Mar. 11, 2008).
JECT,
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short, the fundamental variables that help define a functional environment.81 Thus, where skepticism prevailed, Service biologists today have
noted that the San Juan River Basin Recovery Implementation Program
(SJRRIP)—tied to both ALP and the Navajo Indian Irrigation Project—
has protected both developmental and environmental interests. Most importantly, the program has: (1) brought otherwise disparate interests together; (2) provided real water to work with for the protection of the fish
and other species; (3) given legitimacy to the concept that fish and other
species deserve water for survival; and (4) has provided a steady source
of funding for environmental protection.82 In the end, biologists contend
that it was the Bureau’s agreement to spill water from Navajo Reservoir
to mimic the natural hydrograph that produced the necessary conditions
for program success.83
The 2000 Final Biological Opinion84 on the Animas-La Plata Project is a product of the updated environmental impact statement and
notes the success of the SJRRIP. In the 2000 biological opinion, the Service found no grounds to challenge the Bureau’s call for the construction
of Ridges Basin Dam and Reservoir, Durango Pumping Plant, the inlet
conduit—or “Refined Alternative 4” as described in the 2000 Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement—or the Navajo Nation Municipal Pipeline, as long as the Bureau guaranteed maintenance of the
flow regimes at Navajo Reservoir.85
3. “It can be formulated in such a way that it can be implemented by the lead
federal agency consistent with the scope of its legal authority and jurisdiction.” 86
Both the Navajo Indian Irrigation Project (NIIP) and ALP lie in the
San Juan River Basin, both affect the same population of endangered
fish, both are Native American water rights projects, and both are irrigation projects. In 1991, both the Bureau and the Service stated that the key
to the ALP RPA was the use of water from Navajo Reservoir to mimic
the natural hydrograph for the benefit of the Colorado pikeminnow and
to offset depletions from the Animas River. In 1991, it was also clear that
the Bureau was not considerate of Navajo claims in the basin. Officials in

81. See N. Leroy Poff et al., The Natural Flow Regime: A Paradigm for River Conservation
and Restoration, 47 BIOSCIENCE 11 (1997); David L. Propst & Keith B. Gido, Responses of Native
and Nonnative Fishes to Natural Flow Regime Mimicry in the San Juan River, TRANSACTIONS OF
THE AM. FISHERIES SOC’Y 922 (2004).
82. Brooks, supra note 80.
83. Id.
84. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., FINAL BIOLOGICAL OPINION FOR THE ANIMAS-LA PLATA
PROJECT, COLORADO AND NEW MEXICO 4 (2000).
85. Id. at 5–6.
86. ESA Final Rule, 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1986).
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the Bureau committed to the re-operation of Navajo Reservoir to mimic
the natural hydrograph, committed to a 300,000 acre-foot spill, and ignored Bureau policy regarding prior non-project water rights.87 These violations occurred despite objections from the solicitor for the U.S.
Department of the Interior’s Southwest Region, the Assistant Secretary
for Indian Affairs, and the President of the Navajo Nation.88
Furthermore, NIIP did not benefit from favorable administrative
decisions at that time. Since completion of NIIP in 1990 would have impacted the same population of endangered Colorado pikeminnow on the
San Juan River, the Service conducted its consultation with the Bureau of
Indian Affairs on NIIP and simultaneously developed a biological opinion on ALP. While the result of the Bureau’s consultation on ALP was an
RPA that allowed construction to begin by offsetting Animas River depletions with water from Navajo Reservoir, the biological opinion on
NIIP—released just two days after the final opinion on ALP—did not
offer the possibility of construction until the end of the seven-year research effort. In this case, the Service decided that construction of NIIP
should not continue until the needs of the pikeminnow were known.89
Today the Navajo Nation is essentially a partner in the Animas-La
Plata Project. The Navajo Nation retains a small amount of municipal
and industrial water storage in Nighthorse Reservoir (2,340 acre-feet),
and also received authorization for the Navajo Nation Municipal Pipeline in the Colorado Ute Settlement Act Amendments of 2000. The purpose of the pipeline is to replace and expand an existing pipeline that
runs 28.9 miles along the San Juan River and delivers treated water from
Farmington to Shiprock, New Mexico.90 Additionally, in 1999, the Bureau
of Indian Affairs hired a private engineering firm to conduct a biological
assessment on the construction of blocks 9 through 11 of the Navajo In-

87. The Bureau failed to consider the Navajo Nation’s superior claims for water rights
in the basin and for completion of NIIP in particular. NIIP was authorized six years before
ALP in 1962, giving it a prior project water right in the San Juan River Basin—a fundamental criterion in the doctrine of prior appropriation that the Bureau has defended since 1902.
Next, in 1962, Congress made a deal with the Navajo Nation in which it promised to construct NIIP in exchange for the Tribe’s acquiescence on construction of the San Juan-Chama
Project. The primary beneficiary of the San Juan-Chama Project, which the Bureau completed in 1967, is the city of Albuquerque and farmers in the Rio Grande River Basin. See
Jacobsen, supra note 5; ELIZABETH CHECCHIO & BONNIE G. COLBY, INDIAN WATER RIGHTS:
NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE (1992).
88. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ANIMAS-LA PLATA PROJECT: STATUS AND LEGISLATIVE
FRAMEWORK, GAO/RCED-96-1 26 (1996), available at www.gao.gov/archive/1996/
rc96001.pdf. See also Ellison, Environmental Management, supra note 1.
89. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., FINAL BIOLOGICAL OPINION FOR THE NAVAJO INDIAN
IRRIGATION PROJECT, NEW MEXICO (1991).
90. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FSEIS, supra note 60, at 1.4.3.
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dian Irrigation Project.91 The engineers concluded that the completion of
blocks 9 through 11, with a total average annual depletion of 270,000
acre-feet for all blocks per year, was not likely to “adversely affect” or
“adversely modify or destroy designated critical habitat” for the Colorado pikeminnow and razorback sucker in the San Juan River Basin.92
This decision has two remarkable features. First, it essentially restores
the depletion allowed for NIIP to the levels considered in the 1991 biological opinion. And, second, it is remarkable for the informality with
which the decision was handled. The Bureau of Indian Affairs presented
the engineers’ findings to biologists in the Service, who accepted them in
light of the success of the SJRRIP.93 The expansion of NIIP will require an
additional depletion of 120,580 acre-feet of water from the San Juan River
per year. This level of depletion would have clearly required a formal
Section 7 consultation just a short time ago.
Perhaps most importantly, the Navajo Nation is poised to settle its
water rights claims with New Mexico in the San Juan River Basin. In the
agreement that was signed between the two parties, the Navajo Nation’s
water rights claims will be adjudicated and quantified by 2015 through a
series of decrees in New Mexico’s courts. The Navajo Nation also received various rights, including the right to use de minimus water for
domestic use and livestock and the right to develop small amounts of
groundwater. The agreement additionally calls for final settlement contracts between the Navajo Nation and the Bureau of Reclamation (Bureau) for water delivered through the Navajo-Gallup Water Supply
Project, NIIP, and ALP. Of course the agreement is dependent on a host
of federal funding for the Navajo-Gallup Water Supply Project ($695 million), irrigation project development ($23.4 million), conjunctive use
ground water wells ($77.6 million), the Navajo Nation Water Development Trust Fund ($50 million), and the Navajo Nation Municipal Pipeline (with $47 million already authorized).94

91. KELLER-BLIESNER ENGINEERING, U.S. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, NAVAJO INDIAN IRPROJECT BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT (1999).
92. Id.
93. Interview with James E. Brooks, supra note 80. Interview with David L. Propst,
supra note 80. See also U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., FINAL BIOLOGICAL OPINION FOR THE
ANIMAS-LA PLATA PROJECT, COLORADO AND NEW MEXICO 4 (2000).
94. San Juan River Basin in New Mexico Navajo Nation Water Rights Settlement, State
of New Mexico–Navajo Nation (Apr. 19, 2005), available at www.ose.state.nm.us/waterinfo/NavajoSettlement/NavajoSettlement.pdf. The implementing legislation for the settlement was the Northwestern New Mexico Rural Water Projects Act, senate bill 1171 of the
110th Congress, was introduced in the U.S. Senate by Senator Jeff Bingaman on April 19,
2007.
RIGATION

R
R

\\server05\productn\n\nmn\49-2\nmn202.txt

388

unknown

Seq: 22

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

26-APR-10

15:15

[Vol. 49

4. “It is economically and technically feasible.” 95
In 1991, the situation regarding economic and technical feasibility
was vastly different than it is today. Though the Bureau clearly has the
technical prowess to construct the three features contemplated in the
1991 RPA, the 2000 Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement
(FSEIS), and the Colorado Ute Settlement Act Amendments of 2000—
indeed these features are nearly complete—it did not do an economic
feasibility study on these features because they would not produce any
economic benefits.96 The Bureau’s 1991 RPA, as noted elsewhere, violated both the authorizing legislation for ALP and the implementing regulations of the Endangered Species Act, which prohibits an action
agency from piecemealing a project toward an “irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources.”97 These problems were corrected
through the Colorado Ute Settlement Act Amendments of 2000, which
redefined ALP in terms of the three features contemplated by the RPA
and specifically stated that the purpose of the project is to settle Southern
Ute and Ute Mountain Ute water rights claims.
Another economic feasibility problem emerged, however, because
reclamation law generally requires repayment of construction and operational costs for its projects through direct payment by water users or
through subsidy by power revenues. Under the Leavitt Act of 1932, Native Americans do not have to reimburse the government when irrigation projects are constructed for them98 but municipal and industrial
costs are reimbursable. Thus, since ALP was redefined as a municipal
and industrial water project, a specific provision had to be written into
the Colorado Ute Settlement Act Amendments of 2000 to relieve Native
Americans from the obligations of reimbursement for construction. The
Ute Tribes are, however, required to pay the federal government for operations, maintenance, and replacement costs once the water is used.99

95. ESA Final Rule, 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1986).
96. Ellison, Environmental Management, supra note 1, at 434.
97. The Endangered Species Act specifically prohibits federal agencies from making
an “irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources . . . which has the effect of foreclosing the formulation or implementation of any [future] reasonable and prudent alternative.” 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d) (2006). In other words, any action must be reversible unless it can
be demonstrated that it will not harm the species. This provision was put in place to prevent an action agency from building pieces of a project until Congress had no choice but to
complete a project despite its ecological harm. DONALD C. BAUR & WILLIAM ROBERT IRVIN,
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES 103 (2002).
98. Leavitt Act, 25 U.S.C. § 386(a) (2006).
99. Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights Settlement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-585, 102
Stat. 2973. See Tribal Construction Costs, 25 U.S.C. § 302(C)(2).

R

\\server05\productn\n\nmn\49-2\nmn202.txt

Spring 2009]

unknown

Seq: 23

26-APR-10

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS

15:15

389

Finally, the Bureau of Reclamation did not conduct a cost-benefit
analysis of the project and was relieved of its traditional economic feasibility obligations under the Colorado Ute Settlement Act Amendments of
2000—this was justified by the outcomes of a variety of administrative
processes, such as the FSEIS and the associated Record of Decision. According to the Bureau:
In addition, because [an administrative proposal to implement
the Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights Settlement Act of 1988]
is intended to resolve Indian reserved water rights claims,
traditional cost-benefit analyses do not apply because it would
not account for the primary benefits of an Indian water rights
settlement which include avoiding direct and indirect litigation costs and resolving claims which might be associated
with failure to protect tribal trust resources.100

IV. BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS AND THE
ANIMAS-LA PLATA PROJECT
To a certain extent it is impossible to summarize the Bureau’s position, which is stated in the preceding paragraph, without inducing sarcasm. Such a summary sentence might read: Thus, without the need to
prove the project’s technical or economic feasibility and with taxpayer
funds behind it, the Bureau was free and clear to build ALP. While bureaucratic politics is concerned with the distribution of values by administrative agencies, in this case officials in the Bureau wanted to construct
the Animas-La Plata Project and they did so by eliminating entire categories of public concern through administrative processes that were subsequently ratified by Congress. Broadly speaking, in the name of settling
Indian water rights claims and avoiding costly litigation, the public’s
right to know about the costs and functionality of their investment were
ignored though administrative process. How Bureau officials did this
will be described in the following sections.
A. Expertise
One fundamental problem officials in the Bureau confronted was
undoing decades of work that supported the argument that the purpose
of the Animas-La Plata Project was irrigation. Indeed, the Bureau argued
in the 1966 Feasibility Study, the 1979 Definite Plan Report, the 1980 Fi100. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, RECORD OF DECISION: ANIMAS-LA PLATA PROJECT/
COLORADO UTE INDIAN WATER RIGHTS SETTLEMENT FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT 3 (2000) [hereinafter U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, ROD], available at
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/envdocs/eis/animas/fseis/pdf/rod.pdf.
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nal Environmental Impact Statement, the 1991 Biological Opinion, and in
the 1996 Final Supplement to the Final Environmental Impact Statement,
and other administrative documents, that the purpose of ALP was to
bring irrigation water to the “dry side,” or the La Plata River watershed.
There were three things that needed to be done in order to provide a
new justification for the project. First, the Bureau had to eliminate the
irrigation component without losing the project outright. Second, the Bureau needed to appease rival water users in the San Juan River Basin.
And, third, all of this needed to be sanctioned by Congress. At the heart
of all these activities was also the need to develop a new environmental
impact statement for the project that provided an administrative justification for a scaled down Animas-La Plata Project and addressed the
competing interests in the San Juan River Basin.
After the turmoil surrounding the project in the 1990s, the Bureau
was able to redefine the Animas-La Plata Project as a municipal and industrial project for Native Americans.101 This redefinition of the project
came in two parts. First, the Bureau noted that despite all the administrative activity and studies on ALP, it was never able to prove that the project made sense from an environmental perspective. Indeed, in its 2000
Record of Decision the Bureau stated:
[T]he original project was not constructed because this Department, and many other parties, raised serious concerns regarding the environmental consequences of building the project.
These consequences included a large diversion from the
Animas River which would violate Endangered Species Act
(ESA) requirements and water quality impacts associated with
a major new non-Indian project in the Four Corners region.102

Second, through the Record of Decision and related administrative documents, Bureau officials maintained that they were motivated by their obligation to Native American trust responsibilities and the constant threat
of “extensive litigation” if Ute Mountain Ute and Southern Ute water
rights claims were not redressed.103 These contentions, along with the
2000 construction deadline established by the Colorado Ute Water Rights
Settlement Act of 1988, provided the “purpose and need” for the new

101. It might be a bit unfair to say that the Bureau redefined the project, since the Record of Decision and the Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement ascribe the
redefined ALP to the administration. Still, the administration proposal was developed in
secret and looks more like the project the Bureau wanted to build in 1991 than a project
constructed according to the recommendations of the Romer/Schoettler process—sans its
conversion to a municipal and industrial project.
102. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, ROD, supra note 100, at 1.
103. Id. at 1, 3.
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Animas-La Plata Project, which was the fundamental concept that drove
the analysis for the environmental impact statement. The purpose and
need of the Animas-La Plata Project was to “implement the Settlement
Act by providing the Ute Tribes an assured long-term water supply and
water acquisition fund in order to satisfy the Tribes’ senior water rights
claims as quantified in the Settlement Act, and to provide for identified
[municipal and industrial] water needs in the project area.”104
The analysis in the new environmental impact statement focused
on the assessment of various alternatives designed to address the Colorado Ute Tribes’ water rights claims. These included the administration
proposal for various reservoir levels, increasing the size of federal water
facilities in the area, and non-structural alternatives such as water leasing
and the establishment of a fund to purchase water rights. These alternatives would be compared to the purpose and need, and assessed along
four dimensions: yield, reliability, location, and practicality.105 Most importantly, ALP was subject to the rules of the Indian Self Determination
and Education Assistance Act (ISDEAA)106 because it was redefined as a
Native American water rights project in this administrative process.
Generally, the ISDEAA gives Native Americans a substantive stake in
the nature of the public goods and services they receive from the United
States. However, in this case, the effect of tribal participation in the administrative process was to give the Colorado Ute Tribes a veto over any
alternative that did not meet their needs. Since the Tribes would not accept non-structural alternatives—the expansion of existing facilities or
water leasing—the only acceptable alternative that remained was the
construction of ALP.107
104. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FSEIS, supra note 60, at 19.
105. These criteria are defined in volume 1, chapter 5, section 5-2, page 21 of the
Animas-La Plata Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement: yield refers to
whether the project will provide “wet water” in the amount desired to the Tribes; reliability
refers to whether the alternative will be renewed by the hydrologic cycle; location refers to
whether water from the alternative will be “reasonably available” to the Tribes; and practicability refers to whether the alternative is technically feasible. Id. The only way to meet
these criteria would be to construct the three features contemplated in the administration
proposal and, before that, the 1991 RPA. Id. § 5-8.
106. Indian Self Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450 et seq.
(2006).
107. The alternatives are analyzed in the 2000 FSEIS and are dismissed if they do not
support a structural alternative. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FSEIS, supra note 60. Also,
as noted in the 2000 Record of Decision, “Refined Alternative 4” is the alternative supported by the Colorado Ute Tribes and, by default, is the only acceptable alternative. U.S.
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, ROD, supra note 100, at 2. Finally, according to Earth Justice, the
Deputy Secretary of the Interior in the Clinton Administration, David J. Hayes, stated that
the NEPA process for ALP would be used “defensively” as he promoted the administration
proposal. Hence, Earth Justice concluded, “the Bureau set out to find that a non-structural
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There were two additional problems that went to the Bureau’s assessment of ALP as a municipal and industrial water supply for Native
Americans, both of which were analyzed in the ALP Final Environmental Impact Statement: (1) finding demand for municipal and industrial
water, and (2) addressing the risks associated with changing water rights
from irrigation to municipal and industrial uses. The Bureau conducted
an analysis of non-binding water use scenarios in order to assess demand issues. These scenarios, which included new municipal water use
for housing, construction of an industrial park, and recreation and tourism development, were purely speculative.108 The Bureau, for example,
used data from the U.S. Census Bureau to calculate that the Native
American population on the reservations would increase from 3,287 in
1998 to 15,000 in the year 2100. The result of this increase would be a
housing shortage and a need for new municipal water on the reservation. Though serving as the basis for ALP, the Bureau noted that each of
these scenarios was non-binding and would require the construction of
new structural components that would be subject to future National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) review. The benefit of this non-binding
scenario approach, the Bureau contended, is that it “respects the Colorado Ute Tribes’ sovereignty and protects their ability to allocate water
in accordance with future needs consistent with federal law.”109
The second problem arose with respect to the non-structural component of ALP, as envisioned in the administration proposal alternative.
Under the 1988 Settlement Act, the Colorado Ute Tribes were entitled to

alternative would not work, [and] that is what it found.” Letter from Robert B. Wiygul,
Earth Justice, to Pat Schumacher, Bureau of Reclamation (Apr. 20, 2000).
108. These non-binding water use scenarios were speculative in both the practical and
legal sense of the word. The Bureau’s population projections are simple linear estimates
that account for no intervening events or practical analysis. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION,
FSEIS, supra note 60, at 2–4. Similarly, Colorado water law prohibits speculative uses of
water. The Bureau responded in the General Comments and Responses section of the 2000
FSEIS:
As stated in the purpose and need for the project, the ALP Project is intended to settle the federal water rights claims of the Colorado Ute Tribes.
The settlement itself is embodied in federal law. Because the doctrine of
Winters rights evolved to ensure the Indian reservations and public lands
set aside by the federal government will have sufficient water to fulfill the
purposes for which they were established, certain principles embodied in
state water law, including the requirement of beneficial use to perfect and
maintain a water right, are inapplicable.
U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FSEIS, supra note 60, at GC-7.
109. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, ROD, supra note 100, at 3.
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over 79,000 acre-feet of water.110 But since this figure includes water for
irrigation—which has a smaller return flow than municipal and industrial water—the entitlement was reduced to approximately 52,960 acrefeet, 39,960 acre-feet of which would be stored in Nighthorse Reservoir.
The remaining 13,000 acre-feet111 will be acquired though the purchase of
land and water rights on or near the reservations through the $40 million
water acquisition fund established by the 2000 Colorado Ute Settlement
Act Amendments. The problem, however, is that the purchase of land
and water rights on a willing-seller/willing-buyer basis—and the conversion of those water rights—is no simple matter and may take 10 to 30
years to complete. The Bureau notes that the risks associated with this
approach include, but are not limited to: the “risk of availability of lands
with senior water rights”; the “risk associated with estimating rate of inflation of land prices”; the “risk associated with the assumption there
would be no disruption to market prices of land”; and the “risk of encountering higher costs resulting from a longer procurement period for
land purchases.”112 These risks are in addition to the problems of converting fee simple farmland to Indian trust land, which will reduce local
tax bases,113 and the problem of converting these water rights from irrigation to municipal and industrial uses in the Colorado water courts.
Bureau officials warn, “[S]everal legal considerations and constraints that
may affect the change of irrigation water rights to M&I [municipal and
industrial] use, include but are not limited to . . . the need for court approval . . . the need to deal with numerous objectors . . . [the] time required for change [which] can be substantial . . . [and the] uncertainty
of outcome.”114
Hence, the administrative processes used to justify reauthorization of ALP in 2000 were constructed on the argument that the Ute
Mountain Ute and Southern Ute Tribes should settle their claims for a
municipal and industrial project that develops water for which no market or water right exists and, secondarily, the improbable purchase of

110. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FSEIS, supra note 60, at 2-100, Table 2-52. See also
U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO UTE INDIAN WATER RIGHTS FINAL SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT (1986).
111. These numbers are generated from the Bureau’s discussion of Refined Alternative
4 in the FSEIS. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FSEIS, supra note 60. In the Record of Decision, the Bureau advocates implementation of Refined Alternative 4. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, ROD, supra note 100.
112. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FSEIS, supra note 60, at D-10 to D-12, available at
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/envdocs/eis/animas/fseis/index.html (capitalization
changed).
113. Id. at D-24.
114. Id. at 2-15 (capitalization changed).
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water rights and their conversion to municipal and industrial uses in the
Colorado water courts. This administrative accomplishment goes handin-hand with the agency’s ability to manage its constituents.
B. Constituency Support
One of the most striking aspects of the Animas-La Plata Project is
how we might categorize the project’s proponents and opponents. In
general, proponents of ALP are elites: members of Congress with direct
ties to the project, Secretaries of the Interior, managers in the Bureau of
Reclamation, the water conservancy and conservation districts that were
created by the Colorado General Assembly to lobby for water projects
with public funds, elected officials in Colorado, the Colorado Water Conservation Board, tribal attorneys, and some tribal leaders. Project opponents include members of the general public, concerned taxpayers,
environmentalists, and independent analysts with expertise in economics or engineering. Though certainly not a scientific measure of public
opinion, the testimony and written comments on the 2000 FSEIS, reported in Volume 3a, support the categorization of proponents and opponents as elite advocates for Native American water rights versus
citizens worried about environmental and fiscal issues.115 What is missing from these comments—and from the administrative processes that
supported reauthorization of the Animas-La Plata Project in the 2000
Colorado Ute Settlement Act Amendments—is any concern for the Anglo farmers who were set to receive the tens of thousands of acre-feet of
water for irrigation under previous conceptions of ALP. This process replaced the interests of the “dry side” farmers of the La Plata River watershed with municipal and industrial interests,116 and Native American
interests.
Certainly Native Americans have struggled throughout American
history for support from the U.S. government. This is the truism under
which the Animas-La Plata Project will be constructed. But while the Bureau and its allies had been making this argument for some time, it was
the Romer/Schoettler process that brought broader legitimacy to the
idea that a water war in southwestern Colorado would be a disaster.
Moreover, the process produced a justification for a scaled down, municipal and industrial water project.117 The justification, essentially, was that

115. Id. at vol. 3a.
116. Id. at 2-117 to 2-123.
117. The Romer/Schoettler process was innovative—according to supporters and even
the High Country News—because it brought a variety of groups to the negotiation table. See
generally Marston, supra note 70 (describing the politics of the process). And though the
Romer/Schoettler process produced alternatives that were collectively known as ALP-Lite,
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settlement of the Ute Tribes’ water rights was so critical that all interests
in the project were required to give up or reduce their claims as ALP
went from a diversion of 191,230 to 57,100 acre-feet.
Moreover, as the size and scope of the project was reduced, the
effect was to remove claimants and resolve problems by default, hence
eliminating effective opposition. When the irrigation component was removed from the project, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s
concerns regarding selenium contamination of the water were also eliminated. The Navajo Nation became a supporter when it was given the
Navajo Nation Municipal pipeline. And once the Native Americans in
the San Juan River Basin—including the Jicarilla Apache—came together
to support the project, Earth Justice (formerly the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund), a longtime ALP foe, dropped its active opposition to the
project because it did not want to be perceived as “anti-Indian.”118 The
success of the SJRRIP and the commitment to spill water from Navajo
Reservoir to benefit endangered fish placated the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service.119 Furthermore, Bureau and government lawyers from the Departments of the Interior and Justice simply outspent any local opponents that challenged them in court, such as the Citizens Progressive
Alliance.120
The primary results of the 2000 FSEIS and the 2000 Colorado Ute
Settlement Act Amendments are that the Bureau has been authorized to
construct the features it wanted to construct under the 1991 RPA—
Ridges Basin Dam and Reservoir, the Durango pumping plant, and the
inlet conduit. Through these processes, the Bureau has also protected the
resources of key constituencies and ensured the political viability of a
larger ALP in the future. This contention is supported by legislative action on the project. The Romer/Schoettler process, for example, produced a piece of legislation that was introduced in the House of
Representatives. The Colorado Ute Settlement Act Amendments of
1998121 is very similar to the act of 2000 since it would have authorized
construction of the three initial features. But the 1998 act did not include
a $40 million fund for the Tribes and also maintained the cost-share arthe administration proposal that was ultimately adopted was crafted in secret. For a
description of the Romer/Schoettler process, see DALE PONTIUS, COLORADO RIVER BASIN
STUDY, FINAL REPORT (Report to the Western Water Policy Review Advisory Commission
1997); Colorado Ute Settlement Act Amendments of 2000: Hearing on S. 2508 Before the S. Indian
Affairs Comm., 106th Cong. (June 7, 2000) (statement of David J. Hayes, Deputy Sec’y of the
Interior).
118. Interview with Phillip T. Doe & Alison Maynard, supra note 11.
119. Interview with James E. Brooks, supra note 80.
120. Interview with Phillip T. Doe & Alison Maynard, supra note 11.
121. Colorado Ute Settlement Act Amendments of 1998, H.R. 3478, 105th Cong. (1998).
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rangements envisioned in the 1988 Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights
Settlement Act. Hence, the 1998 bill would have required the San Juan
Water Commission, the Animas-La Plata Water Conservancy District,
and the State of Colorado to put up $8.6 million, $4.4 million, and $16
million, respectively, for the project. Project proponents in the House and
Senate seem to have let the 1998 bill die without much of a fight.122
In 2000, the primary sponsors of the new Colorado Ute Settlement
Act Amendments—Representative Scott McInnis and Senator Ben
Nighthorse Campbell—addressed the flaws of the 1998 legislation: the
Colorado Ute Tribes were given a $40 million fund to purchase water
rights on the reservations; no cost-share was required by non-Indian participants; and the Navajo Nation Municipal Pipeline was authorized for
construction. Thus, ALP would be complete with construction of the
three components.
The only legislative stumbling block that emerged was an amendment by Senator Feingold, No. 4326, which would have de-authorized all
other project components as envisioned under previous legislation, such
as the 1979 Definite Plan Report. Amendment 4326 would have also required repayment of construction, fish and wildlife mitigation, and recreation costs by all non-Indian project participants.123 Senator Feingold’s
amendment was, however, tabled by a roll call vote of 56 to 34.124
The 2000 Colorado Ute Settlement Act Amendments and the 2000
FSEIS are a unique combination of legislative and administrative activity
that hands the Bureau and its allies carte blanche to construct a large
storage reservoir near Durango, Colorado. The most interesting question
122. Another bill on Animas-La Plata was also introduced in the 105th Congress. H.R.
745, introduced by Representative Peter DeFazio, sought to “deauthorize the Animas-La
Plata Federal reclamation project, and to direct the Secretary of the Interior to enter into
negotiations to satisfy, in a manner consistent with all Federal laws, the water rights interests of the Ute Mountain Ute Indian Tribe and the Southern Ute Indian Tribe.” This legislation failed to make it out of the House Subcommittee on Water and Power.
123. See S. Amendment 4326 to S. 2508, 106th Cong. (2000).
124. Id. One consistent aspect of this debate, however, that pits Native Americans
against fiscal concerns and environmental protection, is the platitudes taken by these members of Congress. See H.R. Rep. No. 106-1001 (2000); S. Rep. 106-513 (2000). Though there is
no question that the U.S. government has injured Native Americans, it is also the case that
the United States provided remuneration for past injustices. The United States paid the Ute
Tribes $31 million in the 1950s in order to settle land claims stemming from the Jurisdiction
Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1209. The Ute Tribes received a $49.5 tribal development fund from the
federal government in the 1988 Colorado Ute Settlement Act and $40 million as a nonstructural water rights settlement in the 2000 Colorado Ute Settlement Act Amendments. It
is also the case that the Southern Ute Tribe is worth approximately $4 billion dollars. “Each
of its 1,400 members is a millionaire many times over, on paper anyway.” Moran, supra
note 61. See generally Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, Business Empire Transforms Life for Colorado Ute
Tribe, WALL STREET J., June 13, 2003.
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is, of course, why did the Bureau of Reclamation commit to the AnimasLa Plata Project? The answer, based on thousands of pages of administrative documentation, is to settle the water rights claims of the Ute
Mountain Ute and Southern Ute Indian Tribes. Critics, of course, contend
that there are cheaper and simpler solutions to the water rights problem,
such as allowing the Tribes to market their water downstream, giving
the Tribes water in Navajo Reservoir, or giving the Tribes money to invest in the stock market. Others contend that ALP will provide energy
developers with a source of water in an area with vast amounts of coal
and natural gas, which is one of the non-binding water use scenarios
explored in the FSEIS. What is clear from these legislative and administrative documents is that the Bureau will have to go back to Congress for
more funding before any of this water can be put to use on or near the
reservations.
V. CONCLUSION: THE ANIMAS-LA PLATA PROJECT AND
BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS
The Bureau touted in the Record of Decision that the cost of Refined Alternative 4 at $278 million was “less than half the cost [of the
$700 million] associated with the ALP concept incorporated into the original settlement.”125 The Bureau updated its cost estimate in 2003 to $540
million126 and has maintained that figure as the project nears completion.127 There are, however, a host of additional costs associated with the
project that the Bureau does not systematically assess.128 For example,
Bureau officials describe a variety of non-binding water use scenarios
that will require the construction of additional facilities before the water
can be delivered129 but they do not estimate the costs of those facilities.
As noted earlier, the Bureau contends that these scenarios are for analytical purposes only and are left open in order to protect the Ute Tribes’
sovereignty and to make decisions in the future.130 But these facilities will

125. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, ROD, supra note 100, at 3.
126. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, ANIMAS-LA PLATA PROJECT CONSTRUCTION COST ESTIMATES, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY (2003). The Bureau estimates that the project will cost
$500 million, but does not include the $40 million dollar tribal development fund in its
analysis because those costs were not indexed.
127. Interview with Barry Longwell, supra note 14.
128. In the 2000 FSEIS a variety of organizations call for a more thorough economic
analysis of ALP. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FSEIS, supra note 60.
129. Id. at 2-119 (showing potential conveyance routes).
130. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, ROD, supra note 100, at 3.
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be part of the Animas-La Plata Project and must be constructed before
the Colorado Ute Tribes’ water can be put to beneficial use.131
Most interestingly, while the project is being constructed in order
to avoid the extensive litigation that will occur if the Ute Tribes sue for
adjudication of their federal reserve water rights, the costs of this litigation are never estimated.132 Once again, as noted before, the Bureau contends that it is not possible to estimate these costs and that it is not
required to do so under the Council of Environmental Quality guidelines
that govern implementation of NEPA.133 The Bureau defends its position
most eloquently in the General Comments & Responses section of the
2000 FSEIS. The Bureau notes that while the intention of cost-benefit
guidelines is to ensure that reclamation projects provide a “net benefit to
national economic development,” the “primary benefits of Indian water
rights settlements” and, thus, the purpose of ALP is:
1. Avoiding the direct and indirect costs of continued
litigation.
2. Resolving potential damage claims that Tribes may bring
against the United States for failure to protect trust resources
or against other parties for interference with the Tribes’ use of
those resources.
3. Acting in concert with the United States trust responsibility
to Indian tribes.
4. Avoiding the costs associated with widespread displacement of non-Indian water users.134

Once again, the Bureau maintains that the purpose of ALP is not
to make a national investment but to avoid the “costs of litigation” and
settle Indian trust responsibilities. Yet, the authorities the Bureau cites do
not support this position. The Water Resource Council’s Economic and
Environmental Principles and Guidelines135—the fundamental criteria
the Bureau uses to conduct cost-benefit analysis—does not include a concept that can be used to draw a distinction between Indian and nonIndian water projects. A second authority the Bureau uses to justify its
131. Water marketing is one non-binding scenario that is considered, though it is called
“San Juan and Animas-River Diversions” in the analysis. Under this scenario, the Tribes
would leave their water in the Animas and San Juan River for diversion by downstream
municipalities. The Tribes in the earlier analysis vetoed water marketing because it would
not require the construction of the Animas-La Plata Project. See U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, ROD, supra note 100.
132. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FSEIS, supra note 60, at GC-1.
133. Id. at OR-2-1.
134. Id. at GC-1 (emphasis added).
135. U.S. WATER RES. COUNCIL, ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR WATER AND RELATED LAND RESOURCES IMPLEMENTATION STUDIES (1983).
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position that ALP is exempt from cost-benefit analysis, Secretarial Order
No. 3215, is a policy of the Secretary of the Interior regarding the discharge of trust responsibilities. For the most part, it calls on Bureau officials to maintain sound management practices and does not relieve them
of their financial responsibilities under reclamation law.136
More specifically, Bureau officials cite President George H.W.
Bush’s policy regarding Indian water rights settlements, which urges
agencies to avoid litigation when it comes to the settlement of Native
American Water rights claims.137 But this policy, like those previously
cited, does not relieve the Bureau of its responsibilities in analyzing
costs. Indeed, the policy requires the Bureau to estimate the value of litigation in order to calculate legal exposure, to ensure that the value of the
settlement does not exceed the costs of litigation, to guarantee that nonfederal parties to the settlement engage in appropriate cost-sharing, and
to make certain that settlements “promote economic efficiency on reservations and tribal self-sufficiency.”138 Yet, such cost analyses were not
performed.
These problems bring us back to the questions asked at the beginning of this article. In particular, if the Animas-La Plata Project fails to
stand up to even minimal scrutiny, why did Congress approve it and
why did the Bureau want to build it in the first place?139 In order to answer these questions it is important to stress that ALP is a political project. Rather than building a water project to store municipal and
industrial water, for example, the Colorado Ute Tribes could be given the
water rights of their entire settlement allocation in the free-flowing
Animas River or their rights in Navajo Reservoir.140 But these solutions
136. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, ORDER 3215, PRINCIPLES FOR THE DISCHARGE OF THE
SECRETARY’S TRUST RESPONSIBILITY (2000), available at http://www.usbr.gov/native/naao/
policies/3215.html.
137. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, WORKING GROUP IN INDIAN WATER SETTLEMENTS; CRITERIA AND PROCEDURES FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN NEGOTIATIONS
FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF INDIAN WATER RIGHTS CLAIMS, 55 FED. REG. 9223 (1990) (policy
statement).
138. Id. See also interview with Steve Cone, Member, Citizens Progressive Alliance, in
Farmington, N.M. (Mar. 13, 2008).
139. Stanley M. Pollack and Scott B. McElroy, attorneys for the Navajo Nation and
Southern Ute Tribe respectively, took umbrage when Hannah Gosnell implied that ALP
was a bad project. Stanley M. Pollack & Scott B. McElroy, ALP Lite: A Compromise Project
that Fulfills the Untied States’ Trust Responsibility in an Environmentally Responsible Manner, 41
NAT. RESOURCES J. 639 (2001). It is important to note that Pollack, McElroy and Gosnell are
looking at the project from different perspectives. Pollack and McElroy contend that ALP
makes good political sense. Id. Gosnell contends that the process used to develop the 1991
ALP RPA was flawed. See Gosnell, supra note 1.
140. Water leasing and storage in Navajo Reservoir was proposed by the Citizens Progressive Alliance and assessed as an alternative in the 2000 FSEIS. The legal morass that
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would require critical changes in the Law of the River that institutions
like the Colorado Water Conservation Board, the Bureau of Reclamation,
and state legislatures in the Colorado River Basin currently oppose. Instead, the purpose of this project is to protect traditional water users—
such as Anglo farmers residing on the reservations—and the legal institutions that are used to distribute water in the western United States.141
The Bureau of Reclamation will complete the Animas-La Plata
Project because it controls the administrative processes that are essential
to natural resources management decision-making. The Bureau has
spent at least $68 million over the past several decades on administrative
and technical argumentation in support of the project, and Congress has
continued to ratify those reports and analyses in successive legislative
acts on ALP.142 The Bureau was also able to use its expertise to control its
agency rivals. By placating the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in the NEPA process, for example, the Bureau effectively eliminated administrative static and was able
to speak to Congress more effectively. In the end, consistent with many
theories of policy formulation, it took only a few key people—such as
sponsoring members of Congress, key Colorado politicians, Bureau officials, and local supporters—to push for reauthorization and construction
of the project. Indeed, project proponents have become so brazen that
U.S. Justice Department attorneys have naively—though effectively—
maintained that ALP must be constructed because “Congress has spoken.”143 These attorneys do not point out that the Colorado Ute Settle-

constrains interstate water marketing is complex. Out-of-state water marketing is not presently allowed under Colorado water law unless New Mexico treats “that water as a New
Mexico depletion.” U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FSEIS, supra note 60, at 2-15. See also
Steven J. Shupe et al., Western Water Rights: The Era of Reallocation, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 413
(1989). See generally U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FSEIS, supra note 60, at GC-7 (explaining
that Native Americans do not have to show beneficial use to perfect their water rights in
order to maintain them), available at http://www.usbr.gov/uc/envdocs/eis/animas/fseis/
index.html.
141. Interview with D. Randolph Seaholm, supra note 7. In this interview, Seaholm, the
Chief of Water Supply Protection for the Colorado Water Conservation Board, stated that
his agency’s goals in ALP water rights settlement were to: (1) protect the Compact; (2)
protect the water rights system; (3) protect Indian settlements; (4) be environmentally conscious; and (5) be economical. These sentiments were mirrored in an impromptu conversation at the Department of the Interior with the Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation,
Robert W. Johnson, on May 21, 2008 in Washington, D.C.
142. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY, supra note 126.
143. Interview with Phillip T. Doe & Alison Maynard, supra note 11. Mr. Doe and Ms.
Maynard told the author that, during legal proceedings in District Court, Water Division 7,
Case nos. W-1603-76F, W-1603-76J, 02 CW 85, and 02 CW 86, the Justice Department attorney pursued this line of questioning. The author was also asked these same questions during a deposition on these water rights cases.
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ment Act Amendments of 2000 appear on pages 258 through 266 of a
710-page omnibus appropriations statute, and are sandwiched between
the Vietnam Education Foundation Act of 2000 and the designation of
the American Museum of Science and Energy in Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
It is unlikely that any member of Congress who voted in favor of Public
Law 106-554 knew the details of the bill.
For nearly a century the Bureau of Reclamation has demonstrated
its prowess as a political institution and its ability to adapt to extraordinary change. This adaptability is a feature of its autonomy, as exemplified by its ability to maintain its jurisdiction and reliably deliver public
goods and services to its clientele. Today, the Bureau achieves its objectives by outsmarting its rivals in administrative process. But there are
three problems associated with the type of hyper-administrative activity
that surrounds these types of development and natural resource management issues. First, it is impossible for members of the public to negotiate the maze of administrative actions that dominate the formulation
and implementation of natural resource development policy. It is a bewildering experience—and must have been for both members of the
public and members of Congress—to even attempt to read the administrative documents that were used to support the 2000 Colorado Ute Settlement Act Amendments. The Bureau, for example, published a
plethora of testimonial and written comments in the 2000 FSEIS that
posed common sense challenges to ALP that were never discussed in
Congress—a clear indication that few if any members of Congress (or
members of their staffs) read the document. Second, this type of administrative activity leaves our most important public decisions in the hands
of those who are most astute at bureaucratic politics. While this is a good
thing for those who unreservedly support the theory of administrative
expertise, it is a bad thing from a democratic point of view because citizens rarely have the expertise to challenge administrators in these
processes. Third, following the previous point, it eliminates the possibility of public debate on issues that are critical to entire regions of the
United States, such as water allocation issues in the Colorado River Basin. The decisions that resulted from the administrative processes that
were used to justify the Animas-La Plata Project are rational only in the
context of management and legal institutions—like the Law of the
River—that have become anachronistic in the western United States and
the Colorado River Basin in particular.
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